Also, logistically, someone need to order 1,768,000 million seals on the international market, have it shipped to Pakistan, and then park a couple of sea containers on each premise of the AC just to store the 6.5 million seals. The description is accompanied with an arithmetical illustration from the 1990 election, where I first encountered this system.In addition, you probably need to have a couple of hundred workers in each location to find those seals. shows that the overall results can be decisively changed by rigging only a few well chosen polling places in a few key constituencies and that the visible part of the polling and vote counting can be done in a completely legal and transparent fashion.Lastly, we should probably mention that our service is discreet - even if you'd rather be in the bedroom than organizing your weekend of pleasure, and using the computer is the last thing you have on your mind.
They do not pass on a copy of the result to the polling agents of contesting candidates who are threatened by the police to leave the polling stations and disappear without contacting their candidate till the announcement of the result for that particular constituency.
Out of about 250 polling stations, hardly 25 to 30 polling stations are chosen for rigging.
The remaining polling stations are not touched at all.
The Presiding Officers have no way of knowing which seals will be used in their particular polling station until election day.
So, unless each and every AC office has access to 6.5 million identical seals on their premises and can go through every single box and find these unique 30 seals it cannot be done. The method described is exactly the one I was discussing in previous posts, but the account is more detailed.
: I previously summarized how post-poll election rigging has taken place in past elections in Pakistan and how, therefore, it might occur again.